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The University of
Kansas Law Review
Why Is Health Care Special?*
RICHARD

A. EPSEIN**

ETHICAL PRoPosIos AND POLITICAL DISCONTENT

There are several propositions, both normative and positive, on
which there is widespread agreement today about the delivery of
health care. The first of these is an intangible proposition whose
clout is not evident at first blush, but which turns out to be of
immense theoretical and practical importance in any event. That
proposition is that health care is "special." The second proposition, which is said to follow from the first, is that the special
nature of health care calls for the intervention of government into
the operation of the market-so that the ordinary intersection of
supply and demand should not be allowed to determine the level
of resources devoted to medical care, and, more importantly, shall
not be allowed to determine who receives how much of that care
and why. This view is sometimes captured in the proposition that
health care is a right and not a privilege. The distinction between
rights and privileges has a somewhat specialized meaning, with an
important role to play. To say that health care is a privilege means
that it is available only to those who are able to purchase it in
the market. Legal protection is provided only to the extent that it
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prevents third persons by force from interfering with any contract
between an ordinary individual and a health care provider. To say
that health care is a right changes radically the nature of the
correlative duty. Now each person is entitled not only to purchase
services in an open market, but to call upon other persons through
government to supply that health care free of charge, or at least
at a price below what it costs to fund it. The so-called privilege
of obtaining health care in the marketplace imposes no correlative
duties on the public at large to fund the care provided. The right
to health care through government intervention necessarily requires
the imposition of public taxation and regulation, probably both.
In some circles the rejection of the market has taken on the life
of a categorical imperative-that is, a first premise that cannot be
falsified by any empirical evidence or theoretical arguments to the
contrary. That premise is that access to health care should be
determined wholly without regard to the ability to pay-where the
ability in question is that of the individual recipient, and not that
of a robust system which has at its disposal the powers of regulation and taxation. This proposition can be stated in two different
ways. First, in its more aggressive form, the proposition states
that all persons are entitled to an equal level of care regardless of
the ability to pay. Second, in its more qualified form, the proposition is that all persons are entitled to some minimum level of
health care regardless of the ability to pay. Although these are
both rejections of the market, they point to very different systems
of regulation.
The second set of reasons that health care is sometimes said to
be special is empirical. The area of health care is governed by
extensive regulation, which in its modern form began with the
passage of the Medicare statute in 1965.' At that time there was
a genuine optimism about how the system would work. It was
assumed that demand for Medicare would be uninfluenced by
price, and that price would be influenced by demand. It came as
a major surprise that utilization of the system rose when federal
funds pumped into the area. Since that time, other systems of
payment and support have been introduced, which have also
influenced patterns of system use. The total failure to foresee how
physicians, hospitals, and patients would respond to the change in
incentives is one of the great failures of the planning process.
The consequences have been severe and long-lasting. The system
as it is now constructed, by happenstance and compromise, does

1. Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 290 (1965)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 42, & 45 U.S.C.).

HeinOnline -- 40 U. Kan. L. Rev. 308 1991-1992

1992]

HEALTH CARE

not work. The costs of running the system are inordinately high;
the percentage of our gross national product spent on medical care
has risen steadily from the 1960s to 13 percent today, and is still
rising. 2 Yet the level of coverage afforded by the system is getting
lower; the number of persons who are outside the system continues
to increase; the Medicaid system is in a state of disarray in many
states, with low compensation levels and high delays in repayment;
and the breakdowns and bottlenecks-of which the recent studies
on access to emergency room care are perhaps the most dramaticindicate that certain core institutions do not operate the way they
are supposed to. At a more subtle level, the relationship between
the cost of medical education and the anticipated earnings of most
family practitioners and similar doctors is such that most
physicians cannot afford to pay back the costs, with a market rate
of interest, of their medical education. Indeed, the real salaries
for physicians, especially in the later stages ,of the training, have
been static or in decline. In short, the level of benefits that people
expect to derive from the system seems to be heading down, while
the costs of running the system seem to be heading up. The ethical
imperative of universal health care without regard to ability to pay
collides with the increased inability to fund the operation of the
system at every level.
This discontent has spilled over into the political arena. There
is today an odd coalition that favors some radical reform of the
current system. It includes many prominent businesses and unions
that are anxious to find some way to place on the public payroll
their existing but unliquidated obligations to current and retired
workers. These obligations are substantial: it is said, for example,
that the cost of health care per automobile is greater than the cost
of steel. The discontent comes too from health professionals who
are unable to meet their current financial requirements from existing sources of funds. It comes from legislators and analysts who
are taken with the ostensible success of the centralized Canadian
system in coping with the problem of health care. It is too early
to know whether these forces will be able to overcome the opposition of traditional health care providers, or indeed to forge an
alliance with them wherein comprehensive health care builds on
the present system of basic employee coverage. But it is not too
late to stress that the issue is now "in play" and promises to
dominate, without closure, the debate for the remainder of the
decade (I could say millennium with equal accuracy!). At a time

2. Nancy Watzman, The Democrat's Health-Care Plan-A Nixon Leftover, TiE
CmTsIN SCIENCE MoNrUoR, Aug. 9, 1991, at 19.
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when planned economies are in retreat in Eastern Europe, they
have made a sector-specific renaissance in the United States.
Is EvERYTING SPEciAL?
If this set of medical and political outcomes is what one means
by special, then there is no reason why anyone should be pleased
with the exalted status attached to health care in the United States.
The sequence of errors that has led to the current impasse will
take a long time for anyone to unpack, but I hope that I can give
some little sense of what has gone wrong, and then point, cautiously, to some controversial changes in outlook and policy that
might lead to a redefinition of the current system. It is a tall task,
and one not easily discharged in a lifetime, let alone a lecture.
The first place to begin is with the title of this talk: Why is
health care special? Those of you who have watched the operation
of the regulatory system over the generations will know that the
term special, for all its emotive power, has a certain tired quality.
The term has been used before in countless contexts to pave the
way for some form of government intervention. The intervention
of government regulation into labor markets has often been justified on the ground that labor is special-special because it should
not be regarded as a "commodity" or an "article of commerce"
to be bought and sold in the marketplace. The point here is not
merely one of rhetorical flourish; it is also one of statutory
construction, for the Clayton Act 3 makes just such an assertion
when it exempts labor unions from the operation of the antitrust
laws. Indeed the entire question of labor regulation has usually
rested on this assumption, and competitive markets have been
displaced by complex regulatory structures and statutes which have
fulfilled the promise of their original supporters. They have taken
markets that were perfectly ordinary, and have made them into
something special-special because they are costly to navigate,
inefficient, and unresponsive.
Real estate markets have also been regarded as special, and the
outgrowth has been a complex system of rent controls and land
use regulation, which again has impeded the efficient flow of
capital, and has created bruised and hostile relationships as political
figures make constant adjustments between warring factions, all
of which have strong incentives to misbehave for their private
advantage. There are surely cases in which forms of regulation are

3. Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1988
& Supp. 1989)).
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warranted-oil and gas pooling, the control of nuisances and the
like, but one does not have to rest on the argument that these
markets are special, instead there can be some very precise demonstration of the social losses that follow when rivalrous private
behavior is not constrained by an appropriate set of legal rules.
Indeed, it is to control the use of force that governments are
instituted among people.
We must therefore apply some modest degree of scrutiny to the
proposition that health care is special: surely it is important, but
so is food, clothing, shelter, education, entertainment, and all the
other goods and services that are necessary to sustain life and to
make the life sustained worth living. Importance, however, is not
an argument for government subsidy or support, for if it were
then socialism would apply to things where it matters most, and
lead to the most ruinous of consequences. Instead the importance,
so to speak, of importance is simple: it is important to get the
right set of solutions, be it private or public, to the problem at
hand. Importance does not create a presumption in favor of
government, or for that matter against it. It only raises the stakes
for making a correct decision in the matter at hand.
Two things are missing in the various critiques of labor and real
estate markets. The first is an accurate account of what constitutes
a market failure. Too often that failure is found in the inequality
of income in the population at large-an outcome for which equal
access to medical care regardless of the ability to pay is regarded
as an accurate countermeasure. Yet to the extent that inequalities
arise because persons with greater productivity receive higher returns for their labor, then so much the better. The second missing
element is an awareness that there are failures in collective decision
making that are every bit as great as those which exist in private
markets. It would be easy to assume that collective responses are
preferred when markets are corrupt and governments virtuous. It
is far harder to reach that conclusion when self-interest and
corruption creates difficulties from both quarters.

Two MARKET DEFECTS
In order to find, therefore, what is special about the market for
health care, it is necessary to determine why the ordinary rules of
supply and demand do not yield the optimal result, and then to
see whether something can be done to redress that balance without
undoing all the good things which markets are capable of achieving
in disciplining suppliers and consumers, and in encouraging cost
savings and the economizing of resources. As I see it, there are
several problems here that do require some attention, and both
yield somewhat unfortunate results.
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1. Imperfect Information
It is difficult in many cases to get accurate information about
the cost and effectiveness of medical care. The point is important,
for where markets labor under systematic imperfection of information it is likely that people will make the wrong choices. The
usual logic of the market is such that people surrender what they
have in order to obtain something that they value more highly. If
people do not know the proper values to attach to the services
that they need, then it is quite likely that they will make the wrong
choices, and be left worse off after the provision of medical care
than they were before. Bad information distorts the relative evaluation of goods and services that is essential for markets to operate.
In the area of health care, the problem is apt to be of major
proportions. If you buy a dozen oranges, and the first one does
not taste good, it is possible to return the rest to the grocer or
even throw them away. But if the first surgeon messes up an
appendectomy, it is highly unlikely that a second surgeon will
come along in time to set matters right. Information deficits are
always likely to occur in a setting where you cannot test the
services you receive before you use them.
To state the problem in that forceful sense, however, is not to
indicate a clear solution to it. First, the question of imperfect
information not only arises with private providers, but can also
arise, and with equal severity, with public providers as well.
Anyone who works under a budget constraint is likely to try to
cut corners, and a government bureaucrat, who knows that his
patients have nowhere else to turn, has no real incentive to impart
the information that is necessary to make appropriate choices
either. So in both settings there will be a certain number of
transactions that will shipwreck, and the proper procedure is to
compare imperfect alternative with imperfect alternative. It is not
to act instead as though government intervention which is directed
to the problem of information will solve that problem. It is always
risky to assume that if the ends are laudable, the chosen means
are efficient to achieve them.
In addition, the problem of imperfect information should not
be understood as one that stymies the operation of markets. The
people who work in markets are aware of the problem, and one
of the tasks of a sound system of contracting is to develop those
institutions that deal with information breakdown. Imperfect information is one reason why brand names are important to establish reputation, or why persons may decide to enroll in a group
medical program. It is useful to hire third persons who know more
about the business at hand to navigate the perilous waters one
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faces. The world is filled with middlemen and brokers, with factors
and agents, and many persons assume such roles as part of their
other responsibilities. One job of the architect is to supervise the
work of the general contractor just as the general contractor is
responsible for the supervision of the subcontractors.
In the medical area, one function of the internist is to operate
a specialist-referral network for the benefit of his or her patientsto function, as it were, as Virgil in Dante's Inferno. The internist
knows more than the patient about the arcane workings within
the medical area, and, by virtue of having a large practice, is able
to exert some clout over specialists that individual patients cannot.
Similarly, agency relationships are at work when patients sign up
with a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) or other type of
health provider, only now other intermediates are at work. The
company or union that selects the HMO may be better able to
monitor the HMO's activities than individual employees; and the
HMO may be able to monitor the activities of individual physicians
better than either the company or its employees. The feedback
loops are often complex, and the solutions are not perfect. Still
the risk that the agent will betray the principal is normally worth
running for the gains on the other side, and the risks are in any
event similar to those faced when government agents, whom one
may not be able to select, are called upon to furnish assistance.
The question of imperfect information is common to many markets; and while it is severe, it does little to incline one to a
government solution relative to a private one.
2. Patient Solvency
The standard arguments in favor of the market assume that the
willingness to pay is the standard to determine who gets what
goods. Those persons, therefore, who approach a particular situation with no wealth are entitled to receive nothing in exchange.
The reason why wealth and bids are used to allocate resources are
many and powerful. In many cases there is a positive correlation
between what one expects to gain from the receipt of a good and
how much one is prepared to pay in order to get it. In certain
markets, such as food, clothing, and shelter, the prices that are
charged for goods normally are sufficiently low and recurrent that
they can be built into ordinary budgets. The systems that might
be put in the place of markets-rent control for housing, price
supports, or price ceilings for farm goods-lead to contentious
wrangling for no discernible social purpose. People who just say
how much they need, but who are not prepared to back up their
words with deeds or dollars, will always be tempted to place as
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high a valuation on their needs as they can, at least with a straight
face. Utility may be the philosopher's touchstone, but it is not a
measurable quantity in plain view; and it is easier to determine
whether someone has paid for a particular service than it is to
determine whether that person needs services that can be furnished
without the necessity of personal payment.
Unfortunately, in the case of medical goods and services, it is
easy to envision situations where wealth is a poor proxy for utility
or need. Matters are only complicated because medical expenditures, unlike food and clothing, often come in bunches, which are
very hard to finance out of current earnings. If insurance markets
are not perfect, and they are far from it, then there may be major
difficulties in smoothing out the expenditures for medical care.
Given these imperfections, we can say with complete confidence
that wealth is not what one seeks to measure in the provision of
medical care, but it is harder to say that it is not a proxy that in
some cases at least helps to ration care in an appropriate fashion.
CHARITABLE CARE AND MANDATORY

AcCESS

The twin difficulties associated with information and solvency
cannot just be dismissed here any more than they can be dismissed
in other contexts. But the question is what type of response ought
to be made. At this point, it is useful to distinguish between two
different kinds of responses, both of which share the idea that
contracts for service do not always offer the right way to provide
medical care, but differ in virtually every other way. The first of
these is to organize some voluntary charitable institutions whereby
medical care is given out free of charge. Before the rise of the
public assistance programs, hospitals and private physicians routinely provided health care on just this basis, in a private effort
to bridge the gap between utility and wealth. I can recall the
extensive amount of free care that my father gave in his medical
practice during the late 1940s and early 1950s; and hospitals also
provided extensive amounts of free care. Where care is given on
a free basis one worries less that there is an effort to provide
someone with services that he does not need, even though there is
still some concern whether the quantity or quality provided is
sufficient unto the day.
To argue that voluntary responses are a complete answer to the
problems of the health care market is, I think, a piece of idle
optimism; but to demand that they function as a complete social
response creates dangers of its own: the requirement of perfection
places excessive demands on a system that cannot be made in any
universe where resources are scarce and individual misbehavior a
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serious social problem. In effect, the system of private voluntary
assistance is an incremental program whose sole claim for our
affections is that it makes a bad situation better. It cannot claim
to make a bad situation perfect, for it tolerates both differences
in the level of care that is provided-those who can pay may well
get better medical care-and more critically, it tolerates the possibility that some individuals will fall through the net, that is, the
possibility that persons with serious and curable illnesses will die
for want of appropriate medical treatment.
These weaknesses have not led to the elimination of the charitable and voluntary side of medical care: today it is still easier to
raise money in the private sector for health programs than to do
so for legal ones. But the weaknesses surely have led to a very
different view of what the role of government is. The gaps that
are left in the private system are regarded as gaping holes that
have to be plugged, and systems of government provision are now
used to take their place. In some sense, these systems are judged
by the ethical imperative that I mentioned above, namely, that all
persons are entitled to the same level of health care regardless of
the ability to pay. The differences in levels of care that are routinely
observed in health settings are a tribute to the elusive nature of
the goal in question. What I want to state here is something
somewhat stronger: the ethical ideal carries with it so much implicit
baggage that it can only lead, if aggressively pursued, to many of
the problems associated with health care that one sees in the
United States today. After I have discussed this issue, I will give
my most unethical prescription for what should be done.
Mo.AL HAZARD AND THE EGALffARkIN IMPULSE
The first question is why is the ability to receive care regardless
of the ability to pay limited to health-related services. In principle,
one could argue that all the other important rights that I referred
to above-education, food, shelter, clothing, work-should be
received on the same ground. Indeed, I think that the moral
imperative here could easily be translated into an egalitarian prescription that the distribution of the goods of the world should
be equal, or that deviations from equality should be based not on
wealth, but on the severity of conditions: those with large appetites
shall receive more food; those with more health problems should
receive more medical care; and so on down the line. To state this
is to see in the grand idea a deposit of the traditional socialist
doctrines: to each according to need, and from each according to
his ability. In a world of angels, I could think of no moral
postulate that better captures our true ideals. It is all for one and
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one for all. The levels of production are, in this happy universe,
wholly unaffected by the distribution of the goods that are so
produced, and we all count ourselves the better when any one of
us prospers, so that each views his own satisfaction as though he
were stranger to himself. A utile of satisfaction for me has the
same influence on my conduct as a utile of satisfaction for anyone
else.
To state the proposition in this form is, I think, to refute it, at
least in the general case. The difficulty is that we have to organize
our social institutions to take human beings as we find them, and
not to assume that they will act, or can act, as we would like
them to behave. The only regime in which to each, regardless of
ability to pay, will work is one devoid of the self-interest that
motivates most people, most of the time. Without that sense of
disinterested benevolence, the risk is that people will behave worse
where the level of medical care is guaranteed regardless of ability
to pay than they would if the ethical imperative were ignored. The
wholesale decline of production and initiative under socialism
should not be regarded as a great surprise. It is the predictable
consequence of a set of rules that falsely tells all persons at once
that the amount that they get from the whole is independent of
the amount of contribution that all people make toward the whole.
If my share of the pie is fixed no matter what I do, then I will
cut back on labor and save an enormous amount of personal grief,
secure in the knowledge that 99 percent of the cost of my selfindulgence will be borne by others. Now the ethical imperative of
minimum protection operates in an unintended and unwelcome
fashion-as an upper bound on private efforts of advancement
and self-improvement.
If I were the only person for whom that strategy of malingering
were open, then the system could survive. But when all other
persons see that the same opportunity for advancement is available
to them, then that same decision is played out over and over
again; and when the results are summed, all come out the worse.
Each person of a group wins that game precisely one time, and
loses it all the other times it is played. The one gain is very large,
but it is surely smaller than the product of the small losses
multiplied by the enormous number of losses that have to be
borne. Thus, suppose that the game is played 100 times in a group
of 100 persons. The one time that I win I gain 50 units of health
care, and all other persons lose exactly one unit. The social losses
appear to be 50 (100-50) but my private gains appear to be 49
(50-1). Yet the next 99 times the game is played, I sustain losses
of 1 per round, for a total of 99, which means that my overall
loss from malingering is 50. Oddly enough there is a perfectly
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equitable distribution of the poor outcome, for each person suffers
the same fate: one glorious round of 49 units of profit and 99
rounds of 1 unit of loss. The systematic failure of socialism stems
from the repeated occurrence of just this game.
Markets for all their weaknesses do not have the very important
one I have just described, for markets create a world in which my
prosperity depends on making someone else better off than they
otherwise would have been. Each interaction that produces 1 unit
of net good for me, has to produce at least some net good for
everyone else. The more rounds that the game is played, the more
likely it is that everyone will prosper. The person who nets
$1,000,000 in revenue is someone who, it can be said, has supplied
at least $1,000,000 in benefits to other persons through the mechanism of exchange. There is no grand system-wide dilemma that
works only when A pulls the levers but fails whenever anyone else
does the same. All can imitate A and the overall net product will
surely increase, even if it does so at an uneven rate. Left to their
own*devices, these markets will not fail if they are not regulated
and clubbed into submission. Using the ability to pay to ration
medical care therefore has important allocative effects in a world
of scarcity-effects that are ignored by an ostensible ethical imperative which can work no where else and which will fail in
medicine as well.
DISORDER AND DISCONTENT

How can we see the signs of disorder? Let me give a couple of
illustrations. As noted before, the ethical imperative is one that
has to be funded by someone. Since, by definition, it is not funded
from fees that patients pay for services rendered, it must be funded
out of general tax revenues, and these revenues have to come from
someone. No matter how the revenues are raised, they will involve
taxes on other productive activities, and the taxes will in turn
reduce the profitability of those activities, and hence the amount
of taxes that can be raised. There are, then, indirect effects of the
ethical imperative that do not appear on the books of the medical
expense, but which have to be regarded as costs of the program
in question.
Next it is necessary to decide how the tax revenues will be spent.
In these circumstances, the usual constraints of a system of demand
are necessarily rejected from the system as a whole. It is not
possible to turn away anyone because of an inability to pay. Given
the usual constraint of self-interest, we should expect to see people
demand medical care so long as it has positive value to them, that
is, value above and beyond their own private costs for that care
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(e.g., lost time from work, costs of transportation, the risk of
adverse medical outcomes, and the like). At the same time there
is an increase in demand, there is likely to be a transformation on
the cost side of the business. Marginal cost curves do not always
tend downward: in some cases it can become more and more
expensive to provide the care in question. Even where wealth does
not measure utility, a system that guarantees access regardless of
the ability to pay is one that has to deal with the social losses that
are normally caused by subsidies: costs that exceed benefits to the
recipients even though the benefits to the recipients still exceed the
recipients' own private costs. The usual model for externalization
of costs, and social losses through subsidy, does not disappear
simply because our system of entitlements tries to handle the
solvency question which everyone acknowledges exists. Instead the
effort to effectively constrain one type of problem will normally
exacerbate other difficulties which did not exist in the original
market environment, but which take on strong significance in the
altered environment. Subsidies can distort outcomes in one direction even as they may eliminate important imbalances in the other
direction.
The question then arises: What systems can be used to handle
the problem? One approach is to attack the demand side of the
question, and the other is to attack the cost side. The factors that
go into dealing with each side are enormously complex, and the
standard responses to them are wholly inadequate, and often worse.
What follows is only a short sampling of the types of errors that
we have to face today.
1.

Fee Restrictions

First, on the cost side, the rise of government payment systems
has led to an insistence on the control of fees charged by physicians. Note that one hidden consequence of the current situation
is that patients are far less willing to monitor charges when they
are paid for by third-party providers. This is but another fiendish
version of the socialist dilemma that I outlined earlier: what each
person gains with respect to his own individual case, he more than
loses when others take advantage of the overall situation. In fact,
the basic situation here is even worse because there is no fundamental symmetry in the initial positions, so it is quite possible that
some people will be able to take advantage of the system far more
than others. In any event, the want of close patient supervision
of what transpires means that the ultimate payor has to place its
own restrictions on the fee structure. One of the current battles,
in Medicare, and especially Medicaid, has been frightening in its
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implications. There is no effective way to set the standards in
question. If the fees are left too high, then physicians flock to
provide services that are not needed; if they are set too low, then
physicians will skimp on care, change specialties, or even abandon
the profession. The ethical imperative that medical services be
provided without regard to the ability to pay does not repeal the
ordinary law of supply on the other side of the market: as payment
goes down, the availability of services will shrink.
Or so I would have thought, but the judiciary in some cases
has not quite gotten this message. To mention but one case of
note and import, Massachusetts Medical Society v. Dukakis,4 the
question there was whether physicians could successfully challenge
on constitutional grounds a statute that provided, as a condition
for obtaining or renewing a license, that any physician who treated
Medicare patients must "agree not to charge to or collect from
such beneficiary any amount in excess of the reasonable charge
for that service as determined by the United States Secretary of
Health and Human Services. ' 5 The statute was upheld against the
usual forlorn rational basis, due process challenge. 6 What concerns
me here, however, is not the nature of the legal rulings, but
the cool reception given to the empirical evidence that the Society's
expert offered to support the proposition that the amount of
services provided would be choked off by this statutory requirement.
The point of the expert's affidavit was that lower prices would
lead to less access. 7 I should have thought that this was an
axiomatic conclusion, but to the contrary Judge Robert Keeton, a
former Harvard Law Professor who specialized in tort and insurance, regarded it as so outlandish as to require a public rebuke
from the bench. 8 He could not conceive how any reasonable
factfinder could find that reduced rates lead to reduced levels of
care. Thus, when the Society's experts noted that the inability to
resort to so-called balanced billing would crimp incentives to
provide for costly high-quality care, 9 the judicial response was that
there are other incentives for good care, most notably pride in
work, curiosity, nonpecuniary satisfactions in the welfare of patients and the like.' 0 I am sure that these inducements do play a

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

637 F. Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1986).
Id. at 686. See MAss. GEN. L. Ch. 112, § 2 (1986) for the full text of the statute.
Dukakis, 637 F. Supp. at 706-07.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 695-97.

9. Id.at 697.
10. Id.at 698.
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role, but no one would say that they are sufficient to keep
physicians in business at the limit, that is, without any cash
compensation of any kind. So at some point before reaching that
limit these financial incentives have to kick in. Do we assume that
the response curve is flat for enormous regions of changes in
wages, but then, when the straw breaks the camel's back, that the
supply of medical services precipitously disappears? Most people
draw supply curves as continuous, and not with sharp precipices
and edges, and for an industry I am sure that this view is closer
to the truth than any other. The total compensation package to
the physician does include all the intangibles, but if these remain
constant when fees are reduced, then quantity of services supplied
will be reduced. In reality, the situation is doubtless worse than
this, given that the increase in external controls, whether by private
contractors or government regulation, is likely to reduce the nonpecuniary satisfactions associated with the job.
Judge Keeton was largely oblivious to these difficulties. Instead
of thinking that reduced rates would lead to a reduced supply of
services, he urged the contrary. There may be some effort in
individual cases to increase the amount of work to offset the loss
in revenue, but to not expect reductions in supply of services is
to ignore the lessons of marginal revenue and marginal cost. The
strategy of preserving income by working harder will fail dramatically if marginal costs are in excess of marginal revenues. An
additional $10,000 in fees will not enhance physician wealth if it
costs an extra $15,000 in time and expenses to produce. Instead
of more services, there will be exit from the field, reduced entry
into the field, political pressures to change the rate structure,
unobservable diminutions in the quality of service, and the like.
The supply side of the business is not impervious to price, and
the very fact that the providers of health care are protesting cuts
in their income should make the salience of financial incentives all
too clear. To advocate full access to care without ability to pay,
or even the more modest restrictions on the balanced billing system,
is an open invitation to disaster.
There is, I think, no way to escape the dilemma with a single
payor system, where price flexibility is so hard to introduce and
maintain. What competition does is to allow individual groups to
decide what mix of restraint on access should be blended with
what level of monitoring from without, and what level of fees. I
am sure that no one knows the ideal solution to the major dilemma
with medical care-that is, how much risk should be left on an
individual patient and how much should be covered by insurance,
but I am confident that there are no government measures that
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will ever be able to get within a stone's throw of the correct
answer.
2.

COBRA Legislation

Let me mention only two other difficulties, and these go to the
demand side for services. First, the COBRA legislation requires,
to be eligible for Medicare reimbursement, that all hospitals take
in, without regard to ability to pay, persons who are either in
active labor or who have a serious medical condition.' 2 The COBRA
statute also imposes severe restrictions on private hospitals that
seek to "dump," that is, transfer its nonpaying patients to public
institutions. 13 In effect we have here a situation in which medical
care in an important class of cases has to be provided without
ability to pay.
There are several major difficulties with the program. The first
is that under COBRA the incidence of the public burden on
hospitals is determined in large measure by happenstance, reputation, and geographical location. There are many hospitals that
are not impacted by this legislation because they are located in
affluent communities in which most people have extensive medical
insurance. The Mayo Clinic is not likely to have much COBRA
business in Rochester, Minnesota; but there are others, such as
the University of Chicago and other inner-city hospitals, that
receive a large number of cases of this sort, for which they receive
little or no reimbursement from anyone. The net effect is that
certain institutions run the risk of being saddled with expensive
treatment for which they receive insufficient compensation, or
indeed no compensation at all. The proper response, which will
induce some caution in the amount of care to be provided, is one
that requires the government to contract with private and state
institutions for the levels of emergency care that it wants provided,
and to pay for that care out of general tax revenues. That measure
of financial prudence will force an off-budget decision back onto
the budget, and will therefore alleviate many of the odd distributional problems. It will also lead the government to think hard
about how much care it wants to provide and to whom.
So this brings me to the issue of individual demand for service,
which I will introduce with a recent newspaper story about the

11.

Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272,

100 Stat. 82 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 19, 20 & 42 U.S.C.).
12.
13.

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 & Supp. 1989).
Id.
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homeless. 1 4 The article reports that the head of the homeless
operations in New York resigned in frustration after revelations
that an increase in the level of housing afforded to the homeless
did not clear the market, but only induced persons who lived in
cramped quarters to declare themselves as homeless in order to
obtain preferred accommodations paid for at taxpayer expense. It
was a nice vacation, some reported, especially since the units to
which they were assigned had a market rent in the neighborhood
of $3,000 per month. In essence, the skeptics were correct. The
higher the inducements for being homeless, the greater the number
of people who would cross the line. The demand for services was
not fixed independent of what was provided.
The same moral-hazard problem exists with respect to health
care. If one announces that free care is available for all who need
it, but only if they are in distress, then there is a private incentive
to be in distress. There is an incentive, for example, to avoid good
prenatal care because one can go to an emergency room during
active labor, without medical records, secure in the knowledge that
someone else has to pay. The number of drug-related admissions
through emergency rooms is similarly very high, so that a program
that is designed to handle poverty ends up subsidizing addiction.
The budgetary pressures are enormous, and the displacement of
ordinary patients from hospitals can be large. The size of the
medical problem thus increases because of the access that is now
provided as a matter of right. It has been suggested that we can
cure this problem by giving free medical care up and down the
line, so that people will not have to wait for distress in order to
come to hospitals. But the effort to close down one problemadministrative costs-would only create other problems because
the total level of demand from all quarters at zero price is
exceedingly high, so the funding problem would still exist. I suggest
that at some level we have to "just say no," and be prepared to
turn out of emergency rooms persons with, say, drug-related
conditions. If one is not prepared to let people die when they have
misbehaved, then it will be difficult to find any way to curb the
level of misbehavior. Efforts of benevolence after the fact have
the same effect that they have in the homeless case: they induce
more self-destructive conduct that is in need of medical care. These
efforts offer an implicit subsidy to the same activity for which we
seek to impose punishment through the criminal system. The
complex situation here exists no matter what we think to be the

14.
at 33.

See Michael H. Cottman, Advisor on Homeless Quits, NEWSDAY, Sept. 5, 1991,
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ethical .imperative, which now involves the right to receive care
not only regardless of the ability to pay, but regardless of the selfinflicted nature of the disease or injury. The moral-hazard pressure
for overutilization will not be solved by the mere adoption of a
system of unlimited access.
3.

Terminal Medical Care

My last illustration comes from a different quarter, terminal
medical care, and it is here that I think that we can reach the
greatest progress. The current system has two positions. First, it
will not tolerate voluntary euthanasia, a point which I think is a
mistake, but will not speak about here. The second is that it will
subsidize to the limit any decision to stay alive notwithstanding
the quality of life. In consequence, there is an enormous amount
of high-technology, high-sophistication medical care that is routinely supplied to patients who want, and sometimes do not want,
such care. The net effect is to prolong life for a matter of days
or weeks, or even months, but at enormous public expense. I do
not know the exact percentage of medical care that is spent on
the last ninety days of life, but I suspect that it is enormous. I
think that where there is collective payment of individual expense,
this is the most promising area in which to control expenses.
The basic procedure I advocate is this: require all persons to
decide in advance the point at which they wish to abandon further
medical care. There are today the Acute Physiology and'Chronic
Health Evaluation (APACHE)'5 tests which give pretty accurate
indication of whether recovery is possible. These are cheap to
administer and reliable, at least in extreme cases. What has to be
done is to say that all public aid presumptively ceases at, say,
APACHE 35, and that those who want additional care have to
pay for it. This would be an automatic and fixed rule that limits
the subsidy and fixes the point beyond which the ability to pay
matters. I would give people all the information they want about
the odds of success after that point, and I am confident that very
few would pay the actuarial value, particularly after they have
figured out that they are likely to have a longer life expectancy if
rather than buy this coverage, they instead find ways to spend the
additional money to improve their nutrition, happiness, and health.
The enormous amount of Intensive Care Unit (ICU) heroics will
largely become a thing of the past, and the ICU will return to a

15.

TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY

123 (Clayton L. Thomas ed., 16th ed.

1989).
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more sensible function, which is to allow for massive intervention
to control acute episodes where the long-term prognosis is good.
The system proposed here is an effort to mix subsidy with public
restraint while avoiding the problems of abuse that come with
below-market pricing. I think that it could work.
LIVING WrrH IMPERFECTIONS
So what then is the message? Here I would put it in this fashion.
The insistent demand for medical services often leads people to
believe that rationing should not be done through the market. At
some level, if only for charitable assistance, this is surely correct
because of the weak correlation between utility and its proxy,
wealth. But the asserted corollary does not follow. The usual rules
of supply and demand, the risks of moral hazards, and the dangers
of public subsidy cannot be ignored. The predictive side of economics, and its underlying cautious view of human nature, cannot
be overlooked just because markets do not work without defects.
Every form of regulation not only has its intended consequences,
which are often unobtainable, but also its unintended consequences, many of which are undesirable. Any effort to plug up
one imperfection will bring on others. We are at the dyke with n
enormous holes and n minus x plugs, none of which quite fits.
We can never plug all the holes. To devote all of our attention to
obvious imperfections will lead us astray if we ignore the new
problems we create in an effort to deal with the old. Some hardhead realism must temper the ethical concerns over access to care
that are so widely expressed. Our failures in this area are not a
result of happenstance. They occur because the laws of economics
are not repealed by the laws of the sovereign.
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